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Dunworth: Cassista v. Community Foods

NOTE

CASSISTA v. COMMUNITY FOODS, INC.:
DRAWING THE LINE AT OBESITY?

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc.,t the California Supreme Court held that the state Fair Employment and Housing
Act (FEHA)2 does not protect overweight people from employment discrimination on the basis of weight unless they can prove
that they are "physically disabled" within the meaning of the
FEHA. 3 The court reasoned that, while the statute proscribes
employers from discriminating against people whom they perceive to have a disability,· if that perceived disability does not
fit into one of the statute's specifically enumerated disorders,
then the statute does not proscribe that discrimination. I! The
court then concluded that obesity alone does not fall into one of
the enumerated types of disorder,6 and thus the FEHA did not
protect Cassista from discrimination on that basis. 7
This Note will discuss the background of the FEHA, and
give a brief overview of the federal statutes upon which the
FEHA is modeled, the policy of the FEHA, and obesity discrimination. The overview will be followed by an analysis of the California Supreme Court's application of the law to the facts III
Cassista, and a critique of the court's reasoning.
1. 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993).
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12,900-12,996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993).
3. See Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1144.
4. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12,926(k).
5. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153.
6. Id. at 1152-53.
7. Id. at 1154.
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FACTS

Toni Linda Cassista (plaintiff/appellant) stands five foot
four inches tall, and when she applied for a job at Community
Foods, a co-operative health food store in Santa Cruz, California, she weighed three hundred and five pounds. s After an initial
interview, she was asked to return for a second, more in-depth,
interview. 9 Cassista was neither hired for any of the job vacancies at the store, nor for any of the subsequent openings for
which she resubmitted her application. 10 She called defendant/
respondent Will Hildeburn, Community Foods' personnel coordinator, to ask what she might do to improve her chances to be
hired for a future position.l1 Cassista testified that Hildeburn
told her the members of the hiring committee were concerned
that she could not physically do the work because of her
weight. 12 Hildeburn testified he told Cassista they had hired
people with more experience; however, he also admitted telling
her "there was some concern about your weight. "13
Cassista filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) alleging that Community Foods
discriminated against her on the basis of her weight. 14 After the
DFEH decided not to file a complaint, Cassista filed suit against
Community Foods under the FEHA, alleging that the store denied her employment in violation of the Act's proscription
against discrimination based on physical handicap. II!
8. [d. at 1144.
9. [d. at 1145.
10. [d.
11. [d.
12. [d.
13. [d. The facts are disputed by the parties. Hildeburn and the hiring committee

met with Cassista to discuss with her the reasons she was not hired. At this meeting,
members of the committee gave their views of weight and its effects on job performance.
At trial, Community Foods presented an expert witness who testified that the narrow
aisles and ladders in the store would constitute a hazardous workplace for an individual
of Cassista's weight. Nonetheless, all the members of the hiring committee testified that
Cassista's weight played no part in their hiring decision. [d. at 1145-46.
14. [d. at 1145.
15. [d. After she filed her complaint, Community Foods offered her a job, which she
declined. Cassista refused the offer in part because she believed it came only because she
complained to the DFEH. Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 102
(Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993).
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Cassista lost in the trial court,16 but the 'verdict was overturned on appealY The Court of Appeal held that the trial
court judge issued a prejudicially erroneous jury instruction,18
and that the evidence showed that the hiring committee at Community Foods viewed Cassista as having a physical disability
within the meaning of that term under the FEHA.19 The supreme court granted review to determine whether Cassista had
established disability discrimination under the FEHA.20
III.

BACKGROUND OF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND
HOUSING ACT21

The evolution of the FEHA manifests its reliance upon the
Federal Rehabilitation Act and the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act for its major provisions. These federal laws are relevant to an examination of the FEHA because the FEHA and its
regulations are modeled on the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans With Disabilities Act. 22 Further, the California Supreme Court noted that "interpretations of federal law may be
particularly useful 'to guide the construction' of this [the physical disability] provision of California's antidiscrimination act."23
Finally, the California Legislature declared that the Americans
with Disabilities Act's protections, where broader than those of
the FEHA, shall prevail. 24
16. Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d at 1146.
17. Id.
18. Id. The trial judge told the jury that Cassista had to prove that but for her
weight, the hiring committee would have hired her. The California Supreme Court's
opinion addressed only the issue of whether obesity fit into one of the enumerated cate·
gories of physical disability. However, examination of the briefs filed by the parties and
several amici curiae reveals that all of these briefs viewed that issue as tangential, deal·
ing with it in a cursory manner at the end of their briefs. The issues briefed in depth
were those involving standards of proof, burdens of proof, and specific lines of analysis
developed in previous cases to examine employers' motives when inquiring about an em·
ployee's disability. None of these issues were mentioned in the final opinion. See, e.g.,
Brief of Amicus Curiae Employment Law Ctr., Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856
P.2d 1143 (1993) (No. S028230).
19. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1146.
20.Id.
21. The FEHA is codified at CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 12,900·12,996 (West 1980 & Supp.
1993).
22. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1152.
23.Id.
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(p):
Notwithstanding subdivisions (i) and (k), if the definition of
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HISTORY OF THE STATUTE AND AMENDMENTS

California's statutory proscription against employment discrimination was first enacted in 1959 as the Fair Employment
Practices Act. 211 The Act proscribed employment discrimination
on the bases of race, creed, color, national origin, and ancestry.26
In 1973, the Legislature amended the Act to include physical
handicap as a prohibited ground of employment discrimination. 27 Later amendments combined the Fair Employment Practices Act with the Fair Housing Act into the current Fair Employment and Housing Act. 28
In 1980, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission
(FEHC), the administrative agency charged with the rulemaking
and quasi-judicial functions involved in enforcing the FEHA,29
promulgated a regulation defining "handicapped individual."
That regulation tracks the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,30
which proscribes discrimination on the basis of physical handicap by federal contractors and recipients of federal funds. 31
In 1990, the federal government enacted the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA),32 which adopted the Rehabilitation Act's
definition of "physical handicap."33 In 1992, the California Legislature amended the FEHA, changing the term "handicap" to
"disability" used in the Americans With Disabilities Act of
1990 (Public Law 101-336) would result in broader protection
of the civil rights of individuals with a mental disability or
physical disability. . . then that broader protection or coverage shall be deemed incorporated by reference into, and shall
prevail over conflicting provisions of, the definitions in subdivisions (i) and (k).
25. See Marjorie Gelb & JoAnne Frankfurt, California's Fair Employment and
Housing Act: A Viable State Remedy for Employment Discrimination, 34 HASTINGS L.J.
1055, 1057-58 (1983).
26. Id. at 1058.
27. Id. at 1059.
28. Id. at 1061.
29. Id. at 1060-61.
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1993).
31. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1149-50.
32. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-213 (West Supp. 1991) & 47 U.S.C. §§ 225,611 (1991»;
see infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
33. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1150.
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"disability" and modeling its definition of "physical disability"34
on that of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 35 The result is
that the FEHA and its regulations are in harmony, tracking the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which in turn tracks the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "physical disability."36
Although Cassista arose prior to the 1992 amendment, the
court analyzed it under the amended law. The Legislature mandated that the definition of "physical disability" remain the
same as previously defined, to maintain continuity in the law,37
so the analysis would be the same under either version of the
statute.
The present FEHA proscribes discrimination in employment and housing on the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability,
medical condition, marital status, sex, or age. 38 The prohibition
against discrimination based on physical disability is subject to
two exceptions: where the disability prevents the employee from
performing the required duties,39 and where the disability prevents the employee from performing his or her duties safely.40
The California Legislature declared that the FEHA was enacted because:
It is recognized that the practice of denying employment opportunity and discriminating in the
34. See infra part V. for a discussion of the definition of "physical disability."
35. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1149-50.
36. [d.

37. [d. at 1149.
38. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12,920. The FEHA applies to all employers who regularly
employ five or more people. The scope of the federal statute on which the FEHA is
modeled, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, applies only to federal contractors and employers who receive federal assistance. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1149.
39. Some courts call this exception the "business necessity" exception. See, e.g.,
Greene v. Union Pacific R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
40. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,940(a)(1):
Nothing in this part shall prohibit an employer from refusing
to hire or discharging an employee with a physical or mental
disability. . . where the employee, because of his or her physical or mental disability, is unable to perform his or her essential duties even with reasonable accommodations, or cannot
perform those duties in a manner that would not endanger his
or her health or safety or the health and safety of others even
with reasonable accommodations.
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terms of employment for such reasons foments
domestic strife and unrest, deprives the state of
the fullest utilization of its capacities for development and advance, and substantially and adversely affects the interest of employees, employers, and the public in general. 41

Further, the Legislature has mandated that the FEHA be "construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes
thereof. "42
California Government Code section 12,926 controls the issue of whether obesity is a physical disability. The California
Supreme Court's opinion in Cassista is devoted in large part to
the analysis of this section, which reads:
(k) "physical disability" includes, but is not limited to, all of the following:
(1) Having any physiological disease, disorder,
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss that does both of the following:
(A) Affects one or more of the following body systems: neurological; immunological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs, respiratory, including
speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine.
(B) Limits an individual's ability to participate in
major life activities.
(2) Any other health impairment not described in
paragraph (1) that requires special education or.
related services.
(3) Being regarded as having or having had a disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
anatomical loss, or health impairment described
in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) Being regarded as having, or having had, a
disease [sic] disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment
that has no present disabling effect but may become a physical disability as described in paragraph (1) or (2).43
41. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,920.
42. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,993.
43. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926.
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Cassista brought her suit under the "being regarded as having"
subsection (3).44
B.

THE RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES

1.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to equalize
the employment opportunities of the disabled. 411 Section 504 of
the Act mandates that "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . . "46
Amendments enacted in 197447 defined "handicapped individual" as someone who "(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."48 A major life
activity is one such as "caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working."49
Congress added the phrase "is regarded as having such an
44. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k)(3».
45. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1993). See also Paula B. Stolker, Weigh My Job Performance,
Not My Body: Extending Title VII to Weight-Based Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 223 (1992) (discussing weight- and appearance-based discrimination, primarily
by airlines against flight attendants).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1993).
47. See, e.g., Thomas Edward Seguine, What's A Handicap Anyway? Analyzing
Handicap Claims Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Analogous State Statutes,
22 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 529, 531 (1986) (discussing the history of the Rehabilitation Act
and giving an in-depth analysis of the statute, and several case studies involving analogous state statutes).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1993).
49. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1993). The regulations promulgated under the statute
by the Department of Health and Human Services provide in part:
(iv) "Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a
physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient as
constituting such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only
as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment
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impairment" "to protect people who are denied employment because of an employer's perceptions, whether or not those perceptions are accurate. It is of little solace to a person denied employment to know that the employer's view of his or her
condition is erroneous."110
2.

The Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990111 extended the
protections of the Rehabilitation Act to the private sector.1I2 Until July 25, 1994, the ADA's proscriptions against disability discrimination apply to all private employers with twenty-five or
more employees. liS After that date, the ADA extends to private
employers with fifteen or more employees. The ADA applies immediately to all governmental and public entities. 1I4
Congress enacted the ADA upon finding that some
43,000,000 Americans have some form of physical or mental dis-

ability,1I11 are continually subjected to discrimination in a variety
of contexts including employment,1I8 and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally.067
Further, people with disabilities are:
[A] discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected
to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness
in our society, based on characteristics that are
beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society . . . :i8

"Qualified individuals with disabilities" are protected by Ti50. E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Haw. 1980).
51. See supra note 32.
52. See Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 475 (1991).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5)(A) (1991).
54. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 app. A (1992).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12,l01(a)(1).
56. [d. § 12,101(a)(5).
57. [d. § 12,101(a)(6).
58. [d. § 12,101(a)(7).
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tle I of the ADA,1I9 which defines "physical disability" by the
same definition as that of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 60 Employers may raise the same two defenses to a charge of discrimination under the ADA as under the Rehabilitation Act: business
necessity and safety concerns. 61
IV.

OBESITY DISCRIMINATION DECISIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES

Case law in the area of obesity discrimination in the state
and federal courts reveals that the courts are split among three
predominant holdings: Obesity is not a disability; weight standards are related to safety concerns and thus are legal; or obesity is a disability.
A.

OBESITY IS NOT A DISABILITY

Most courts considering the issue of obesity discrimination
have held that obesity, without more, is not a physical disability.62 For example, in Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home,63
a nurse's aide brought suit alleging in part that she was discharged because of her obesity in violation of state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of physical disability. The employee testified that she suffered from no medical condition in
connection with her obesity, and that her weight did not impair
her abilities. 64 The court stated without analysis that obesity
alone does not constitute a physical disability.611
In Tudyman v. United Airlines,66 a male bodybuilder
59. Id. § 12,112(a).
60. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
61. Jones, supra note 52, at 482 (analyzing in depth the provisions of the ADA). In
addition, a third defense under the ADA allows religious entities to give hiring preference to people of a certain religion. Id.
62. See, e.g., Donald L. Bierman, Jr., Employment Discrimination Against Overweight Individuals: Should Obesity Be A Protected Classification?, 30 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 951, 961 (1990) (discussing what obesity means, what constitutes a handicap, and
obesity discrimination case law).
63. 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987).
64. Krein, 415 N.W.2d at 796. Krein testified that her weight aggravated her asthma
and made her more susceptible to colds and flu. The court stated that these common
ailments did not constitute a disability. Id.
65. See id.
66. 608 F. Supp. 739 (D. Cal. 1984).
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brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act alleging discrimination on the basis of physical handicap. He was terminated and
. his subsequent petition for reinstatement was denied because
his weight exceeded the airline's height-weight guidelines. 67 The
court held the "inability to obtain a single job does not render
one 'handicapped'."88 The court observed that the plaintiff's
weight was "self-imposed and voluntary," a fact the court considered important. 69
In a holding substantially identical to that of Cassista, and
resulting from a similar analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that in order for obesity to constitute a physical disability, a claimant must show that his or her obesity was caused
by, or caused, a type of disorder within the meaning of Pennsylvania's statute. 70 In that case, a city laborer failed to lose enough
weight to meet height-weight standards promulgated for city laborers, and the city suspended him without pay.71
Courts have thus used either dissimilar analyses, or assertion unaccompanied by analysis, to reach the holding that obesity is not a protected disability.
67. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 741. The opinion noted that the bodybuilder was not
overweight or in poor shape; in fact, his low percentage of fat and high percentage of
muscle resulted in his weight exceeding the airline's standards.
68. Id. at 745; see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 746. The court analogized the bodybuilder's weight to the "voluntary"
conditions of drug addiction and alcoholism, and noted that amendments to the Rehabilitation Act in 1978 specifically excepted some present addicts and alcoholics from inclusion as protected handicapped individuals under the Act. Id.

70. Civil Servo Comm'n v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 591 A.2d 281
(Pa. 1991) (holding that an employee's requested job transfer to a park laborer position
could be predicated on his losing weight, since obesity was not a protected handicap).
The pertinent Pennsylvania statute tracks the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See id. at 28283. See also Robin Chodak, Civil Rights-Handicap Discrimination Law-Pennsylvania
Excludes Obesity From Protection Under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 623 (1992) (analyzing this decision in detail and discussing handicap discrimination in genera!); Greene v. Union Pac. R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wa. 1981)
(holding that obesity is not a physical handicap within the contemplation of Washington
law because it is "not an immutable condition such as blindness or lameness"); Missouri
Comm'n on Human Rights V. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 699 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (noting in dicta that obesity, without more, was probably not a handicap).
71. Civil Servo Comm'n V. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 591 A.2d 281,
281-82 (Pa. 1991).
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WEIGHT STANDARDS ARE RELATED TO SAFETY CONCERNS

In some cases courts have held that weight standards are
legal if they constitute a "bona fide occupational qualification"
(BFOQ).72 For example, in Lipton v. New York State Human
Rights Appeal Board,73 the court held without analysis that the
complainant's obesity and high blood pressure diminished her
ability to perform her job. The court added that the Appeal
Board should "restrict its intervention to cases in which the alleged discrimination is unrelated to the nature of the
employment. "74
In Velger v. Williams,7Il an obese man was discharged from
his probationary position as a hazardous waste investigator. He
alleged that he was dismissed in part because of his weight. 76
The court held that "an employer is not guilty of unlawful dis.crimination against a person with a physical impairment if that
person's condition is 'in any way related to the duties the person
was required to perform in connection with [his] position'."77
Another case that involved weight and the ability to adequately perform job duties is McMillen v. Civil Service Commission. 7s A fire department ambulance driver charged the Los Angeles City Fire Department with discriminating against him on
the basis of physical disability when the Department disciplined
him for failing to meet body weight standards. 79 The court reasoned that because ambulance drivers are required to possess
strength, agility, and the ability to lift and climb,so the depart72. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,940; Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice
Comm'n, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding a trucking company's blanket policy of excluding all persons with back anomalies from employment violated the Fair Employment Practice Act (now the FEHA)). In a discussion of the BFOQ defense raised by
the tmcking company, the court noted that the defense "relates to whether handicapped
persons are unable to presently safely and efficiently perform the job duties." [d. at 550.
73. 413 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1979).
74. Lipton, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
75. 500 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (App. Div. 1986).
76. [d. Petitioner was also Jewish, and alleged that his religion provided another
basis for his dismissal. The court noted that among the reasons for the petitioner's dismissal were "his weight, his poor personal hygiene and his bad attitude."
77. [d. at 412 (citing Miller v. Ravitch, 60 N.Y.2d 527 (1983)) (emphasis added).
78. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548 (Ct. App. 1992).
79. [d. at 550.
80. [d. at 551.
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ment's weight standards were reasonable "as a means of ensur. ing the safety of its employees and members of the public."81
The court held, "[e]mployee height and weight limitations may
be prescribed by an employer where there is a rational basis for
such limitations, as shown by supportive analytical factual data
rather than stereotypical generalizations. "82

C.

OBESITY IS A DISABILITY

Few cases dealing with obesity discrimination have held
that obesity without more constitutes a physical disability.8s In
State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp.,8' Xerox Corporation refused to hire Catherine McDermott because she was
obese. She failed the preemployment medical examination solely
because of her obesity, and the examining physician concluded
that she was "not medically acceptable" for employment. 811 The
State Division of Human Rights filed a complaint against Xerox
on McDermott's behalf, alleging that she was discriminated
against on the basis of a disability in violation of New York's
Human Rights Law. 88 That statute defines "disability" more
broadly than statutes which track the Rehabilitation Act. 87
Under the Human Rights Law, disabilities "are not limited to
physical or mental impairments, but may also include 'medical'
impairments. . . . [T]o qualify as a disability, the condition may
manifest itself . . . by being 'demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques'."88 The court
held that McDermott's obesity fell into that definition of disability because it was clinically diagnosed, and rejected the argument that the statute should apply only to immutable disabili81. Id. McMillen (the ambulance driver) did not feel his weight compromised his
ability to perform his duties. Id. at 550.
82. Id; see also Hegwer v. Board of Civil Servo Comm'rs, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Ct.
App. 1992) (upholding the suspension of an obese paramedic who suffered from a thyroid
condition in part because the Department's weight standards were based upon a bona
fide occupational qualification).
83. Michigan is the only state that explicitly includes weight as a protected classification. See, e.g., Karol V. Mason, Employment Discrimination Against the Overweight,
15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 337, 354 (1982).
84. 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985).
85. Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 696. The medical examination revealed no other conditions except obesity.
86.Id.
87. Id. at 698.
88.Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss2/6

12

Dunworth: Cassista v. Community Foods

1994]

CASSISTA v. COMMUNITY FOODS, INC.

535

ties: "[T]he statute protects all persons with disabilities and not
just those with hopeless conditions."89
New Jersey's statutory prohibition against discrimination
against disabled people is substantially similar to the New York
statute. 90 In Gimello u. Agency Rent-A-Car Systems,9} an office
manager for a car rental company claimed he was fired because
he was obese. 92 The court affirmed the conclusion of the administrative law judge that Gimello, in part because he had sought
medical treatment for his obesity, had shown that his obesity
constituted a physical "handicap" within the meaning of the
statute. 93 The court limited its holding to the facts, noting that
the lower court did not address the issue of whether obesity was
a disability in every case. 94
In a recent decision, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's ruling granting damages and equitable relief to a woman denied reemployment because of her obesity.91i
Bonnie Cook had two separate periods of employment as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals (MHRH);
both times she maintained a spotless performance record. 96
When she sought reemployment, MHRH refused to rehire her in
part because it claimed her obesity impaired her ability to evacuate patients in an emergency.97 Cook brought suit against
MHRH under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 98 The jury
returned a verdict for Cook, which the First Circuit affirmed on
89. [d.

90. See Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., 594 A.2d 264, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991).
91. 594 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
92. [d. at 265. The court's detailed summary of the facts showed that during his
five-year employment with the car rental company, Gimello received many commendations for his superior performance. Two upper-level officers of the company objected to
Gimello because of his obesity, and were the source of the discriminatory treatment of
Gimello. [d. at 266-72.
93. [d. at 273.
94. [d.
95. Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1993).
96. [d. at 20.
97. [d. at 21. MHRH also claimed that Cook's obesity put her at risk of contracting
more serious ailments, which would result in absenteeism and workers' compensation
claims. [d.
98. Cook, 10 F.3d at 21.
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appea1. 99

Cassista was decided while Cook was on appeapoo The California Supreme Court discussed with approval the portion of the
lower court opinion in Cook that stated, "to the extent that
obesity is a transitory or self-imposed condition resulting from
an individual's voluntary action or inaction, it would be neither
a physiological disorder nor a handicap."lol The First Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's ruling on this point,
noting the Rehabilitation Act:
contains no language suggesting that its protection is linked to . . . whether an individual contributed to his or her impairment. On the contrary, the Act indisputably applies to numerous
conditions that may be caused or exacerbated by
voluntary conduct, such as alcoholism, AIDS, diabetes, [and] cancer resulting from cigarette
smoking. . . .102

Bonnie Cook claimed that MHRH discriminated against her
because it perceived her obesity to be a disability.l03 The First
Circuit analyzed the interpretive regulations of the Rehabilitation Act,104 and noted that the enumerated disorders in the regulations "are open-ended; they do not purport to set forth [an
exclusive] list of specific diseases and conditions ... because of
the difficulty of .ensuring the comprehensiveness of any such
list. "105 MHRH's own expert physician gave his opinion that
"obesity affects 'virtually every [body] system,' including the
cardiovascular, immune, musculoskeletal, and sensory
99.Id.
100. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 5, Cassista v. Community

Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993) (No. S028230) (arguing that the California Supreme Court's favorable discussion of the reasoning of Cook was a violation of the California Rules of Court, which disallow citation of the lower court opinion where the case
is on appeal).
101. See Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1152 (citing Cook v. Rhode Island, 783 F. Supp. 1569,
1573 (D. R.I. 1992), aft'd, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
102. Cook, 10 F.3d at 24.
103. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22.
104. These regulations and the FEHA are substantially identical. See supra note 43
and accompanying text.
105. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22-23 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1992»; see also CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k)(1)(B).
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systems. "106
The court proceeded to analyze whether Cook's obesity limited one or more of her major life activities. 107 MHRH's physician refused to hire Cook because he believed that her obesity
hampered her ability to walk, lift, bend, stoop, kneel, and thus
work; the court held that MHRH perceived Cook as being unable to function in major life activities on this basis. lOS Noting
that "in a society that all too often confuses 'slim' with 'beautiful' or 'good' . . . obesity can present formidable barriers to employment," the court held that the record presented ample evidence for the jury to conclude MHRH discriminated against
Cook because it perceived her to be disabled. 109
Like the cases rejecting obesity as a disability, the cases
which include obesity within statutory protections of the disabled do not present a common pattern of reasoning. The Rhode
Island court analyzed the same statute as did California and
Pennsylvania,l1O and reached the opposite conclusion. The other
cases discussed in this section involved antidiscrimination statutes that differ from the Rehabilitation Act and those state statutes which track it. 111 Obesity discrimination remains a fluctuating and non-cohesive area of law.
V.

THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS

The California Supreme Court began its analysis by undertaking to determine the parameters of the phrase "physical disability," beginning with an examination of the statutory language
of the FEHA. The court next discussed the standard of "physical disability" formulated in American National Insurance Co.
v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,l12 because the
Legislature expressly included that standard in the statutory
definition.ll3 After a brief survey of case law involving obesity
Cook, 10 F.3d at 23 n.6.
See id. at 25 (applying 45 C.F.R. § 84.3U)(2)(ii).
Id.
Id. at 28.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
651 P.2d 1151 (Cal. 1982).
113. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k) (West Supp. 1993).

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
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discrimination, the court concluded that Cassista failed to present a prima facie case of physical disability discrimination:
[I]t is not enough to show that an employer's decision is based on the perception that an applicant is disqualified by his or her weight. The applicant must be "regarded as having or having
had" a condition "described in paragraph (1) or
(2)," to wit, a physiological disease or disorder affecting one or more of the bodily systems. 114

A.

DEFINING "PHYSICAL DISABILITY"

1.

The Statutory Definition

The court stated at the outset of the opinion that its task on
review was a narrow one: to determine whether Cassista's weight
fit into the definition of "physical handicap" in the statute. ll5
The court stressed that it would not itself define "physical handicap," but only determine the parameters of the term as deduced
from the language and legislative history of section 12,926 of the
FEHA.1l6
After providing a brief history of section 12,926, the court
discussed in great detail the disorders enumerated in the statute, i.e., explicating the phrases "impairment of sight, hearing
[sic] or speech", "amputation", and "loss of coordination."1l7
The court then addressed the holding in American National Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission. 1l8
2. The Definition of "Physical Disability" in American
National

The statutory standard for "physical disability" includes
the court's previous construction of the term "physical
114. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153.
115. Id. at 1146-47.
116. Id. This suit arose under the pre-1992 version of the statute, but the court

analyzed it under the amended language, pursuant to the Legislature's declared intention that the standard of "physical disability" remain the same. Id. at 1149.
117. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1147.
118. 651 P.2d 1151 (Cal. 1982).
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handicap"ll9 in American National Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission. 120 In that case, the court examined whether high blood pressure, in the circumstances of
that case, fit into the category of physical handicap for purposes
of Labor Code section 1420,121 the predecessor statute to the
FEHA.122 The defendant insurance company,. as a matter of policy, did not hire people with high blood pressure for jobs as sales
and debit agents, because it regarded that position as a stressful
one. 123 It terminated Dale Rivard from his position as a sales
and debit agent because he had high blood pressure, and Rivard
filed a complaint against the company, alleging that it discriminated against him on the basis of physical handicap.124
The court examined section 12,926(h),l2I! which provided a
definition of "physical handicap" that "includes [impairment of
sight, hearing, etc.]." The court analyzed the statute's use of the
word "includes" and determined that the word was not intended
by the legislature to endorse a restrictive definition, because a
specifically restrictive term, such as "means," could have been
chosen.126 Noting the legislative mandate that the provisions of
the FEHA be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes of
the statute, the court held that high blood pressure, since "[it] is
physical, and often it is handicapping," was a physical handicap
protected by the FEHA.127 Turning to Webster's dictionary for
an ordinary definition of "handicap," the court found that a
handicap is "a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually
difficult," and held that a condition of the body which has that
disabling effect is a physical handicap.128
the

Although the Legislature expressly mandated that
amended definition retain the American National

119. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1149.
120. 651 P.2d 1151 (1982).
121. [d. at 1153-54.
122. See Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 25, at 1059 n.23.
123. American Nat'l, 651 P.2d at 1153.
124. [d.
125. The amended version of subsection (h) is subsection (k). See, e.g., Cassista, 856
P.2d at 1149.
126. American Nat'I, 651 P.2d at 1154.
127. [d. at 1155-56.
128. [d. at 1155. The court noted a report from the World Health Organization that
defined handicap as a "loss or limitation on the individual's ability to participate in the
life of the community on an equal basis with others." [d. at 1155 n.5.
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construction,t29 the court in Cassista redefined the term "physical disability," holding that it means "an actual or perceived
physiological disorder which affects a major body system and
limits the individual's ability to participate in one or more major
life activities."lso This new standard does not in fact retain the
American National standard: "a disadvantage that makes
achievement unusually difficult."lsl The new standard is more
stringent than that enunciated in American National, because
the new standard adds the requirement that the perceived disability must be in fact a "physiological disorder which affects a
major body system. "IS2
B.

CASSISTA'S OBESITY

As A PHYSICAL DISABILITY

With the standard of "physical disability" established, the
court then analyzed whether Cassista's excess weight was a
physical disability. A brief survey of the limited case law in the
area of weight discrimination revealed decisions that either allowed weight to be a factor of employment qualification under
the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception,t3s or rejected excess weight as a handicap because it is a "self-imposed
and voluntary" condition. 134 In most of the cases examined by
the court, excess weight, without a "related medical condition or
other impairment, is not a handicap."13~ The court distinguished
the cases in which excess weight was held to constitute a physical disability on the ground that "local antidiscrimination laws
have widely varying texts and historical antecedents. m3G
129. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926.
130. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1150.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., Hegwer v. Board of Civil Service Comm'rs, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 397-98
(Ct. App. 1992); supra note 82.
134. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1152 (citing Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp.
739 (D. Cal. 1984); Cook v. Rhode Island, 783 F. Supp. 1569 (DR!. 1992)). The court
focused on these cases which rejected weight discrimination claims where the courts
viewed the claimant's excess weight as a voluntary condition in the absence of medical
evidence asserting a physiological cause. Contra Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17 (1st
Cir. 1993) (specifically disapproving the relevance of voluntariness to whether the condition is protected).
135. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153 (citing Bruce!. Shapiro, The Heavy Burden of Establishing Weight as a Handicap Under Anti-Discrimination Statutes, 18 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 565, 569 (1991)).
136. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1150-51 n.11 (citing State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox
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Cassista did not suffer from any medical conditions caused
by, nor impairments related to, her excess weight. 137 Consequently, the court concluded that her weight was not a physical
disability within the meaning of the FEHA.138
Cassista contended that even though an individual does not
have an actual disability, he or she may still come within the
purview of the statute if that individual is regarded as having a
disability by the prospective employer .139 Her argument was
based on the section of the statute that provides that physical
disability includes "being regarded as having or having had .
a disorder."14o
The court found Cassista's argument unavailing,141 stating
that the plain language of the statute required a claimant to
show that the disability the employer perceived her to have
must fall into one of the enumerated categories of disorders. 142
"In other words, the condition, as perceived by the employer,
must still be in the nature of a physiological disorder within the
meaning of the FEHA, even if it is not in fact disabling."143 Because Cassista failed to present evidence that her excess weight
was caused by, or in turn caused, a physiological disorder within
the meaning of the FEHA, she failed to establish a prima facie
case of employment discrimination. 144
VI.

CRITIQUE

The court's analysis is incomplete. First, its "plain language" approach omits some of the plain language of the statute. 1411 Second, the court implicitly rejects the policy of liberal
Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985); Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Systems, 594 A.2d 264
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)).
. 137. Cassista maintained throughout the trial that she is "a healthy, fit individual."
[d. at 1154.
138. [d.
139. [d. at 1153.
140. [d. (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k)(3)).
141. [d.; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
142. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153.
143. [d.
144. [d. at 1154.
145. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for the full text of § 12,926(k).
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construction set forth in American National,14.6 while purporting
to follow that case in accordance with the express legislative
mandate. 147
A.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE

In holding that a perceived disability must be one that falls
within the purview of the statute, the court relies on specific language in the pertinent paragraph: "[b]eing regarded as having or
having had a disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment described in paragraph (1) or (2)."148 That paragraph includes within the term
"physical disability" the employer's perception of the individual
as disabled by a disorder described in the previous
paragraphs. 149 Thus the court concluded that the disability the
employer perceives must be one of the disabilities specifically.
enumerated in paragraph (1) or (2); if the perceived disability is
not one of the disorders listed, then discrimination on that
ground is not proscribed by the FEHA.lI1O
In reaching this conclusion, the court purports to construe
the plain language of the statute.lIIl However, the court ignores
the opening words of the section it undertakes to construe:
" 'physical disability' includes, but is not limited to, all of the
following .... "1112 The plain language of the statute in full states
that the description of "physical disability" given is not the exclusive one. IllS
146. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 651 P.2d 1151,
1155-56 (1982).
147. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,926.
148. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1148 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k) (West Supp.
1993».
149. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12,926(k).
150. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153-54. See also Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 5, Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (1993) (No. S028230), in
which Cassista's attorney observes that the portion of the supreme court's opinion analyzing "Perception of Handicap or Disability" is "lacking in analysis. Instead of interpreting and applying the existing law ... this Court ... eviscerates the prohibition
against discrimination based on perceived handicap that is articulated by the Legislature
. . . . " Id. at 5.
151. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153.
152. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k) (emphasis added).
153. See id.
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The court has previously construed the word "includes" in a
statutory definition. In People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. 154 the
court construed two Public Utilities Code sections which defined
"public utilities" and "common carriers" and gave a list of "inclu[ded]" entities. 155 The court held that the lists were not exclusive, noting "[t]he term 'includes' is ordinarily a word of enlargement and not of limitation. The statutory definition of a
thing as 'including' certain things does not necessarily place
thereon a meaning limited to the inclusions. "156 In the instant
case, the statutory language is even more explicit. Section
12,926(k) states that the definition of "physical disability" "includes, but is not limited to" a list of disorders. 157
The court disregarded this, and provided instead an unnecessary analysis of the different types of enumerated physiological disorders. That analysis was unnecessary because Cassista
did not contend that she had any disease, anatomical loss, or
health impairment. 158 She averred that she was actually healthy
and fit,159 and that Community Foods regarded her as having a
physical disability she did not in fact possess.1 60
The court's analysis of the statute violated two of its own
rules of statutory construction. First, the court disregarded the
canon it recognized in Klarfeld v. Berg: 16l "In analyzing the text
of these enactments, we are bound by the fundamental rule that
154. 268 P.2d 723 (Cal. 1954).
155. [d. at 733.
156. [d. at 733; accord, People v. Horner, 87 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920 (Ct. App. 1970)

(construing a statutory definition of tear gas "includ[ing]" an illustrative but not exclusive list).
157. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,926(k) (emphasis added).
A considerable portion of the court's opinion in Cassista reviewed with approval
Justice Mosk's dissent in American National, in which he criticized the majority's construction of the term "includes." When American National was decided, section 12,926
contained only the word "includes" at the beginning of the definition of physical disability. In dissent, Justice Mosk noted that "the Legislature makes it clear that it is using
'includes' as a term of enlargement by adding the phrase, 'including, but not limited to
.... " American Nat'l, 651 P.2d at 1156. The amended version of the statute now contains the phrase "includes, but is not limited to"; it is interesting that the Cassista court
discussed with approval some excerpts of Justice Mosk's dissent in American National
but omitted that part and did not adopt his construction of that phrase.
158. See Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1147-49.
159. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1154.
160. [d. at 1153.
161. 633 P.2d 204 (Cal. 1981).
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it is our duty to adopt a construction which will effectuate the
purpose which the legislative body sought to promote in enacting the statute or ordinance. "162 The Legislature did not leave
its intentions in doubt: "The provisions of this part shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes
thereof."163 One of the purposes of the FEHA is to eliminate discrimination in employment;164 the court's conservative construction of the statute has the opposite effect.
Also, in Fields v. EU/ 65 the court noted that "[s]trained interpretation, or construction leading to unreasonable or impractical results, is to be avoided."166 The result of the holding in
Cassista is unreasonable. An employer who discriminates against
an obese employee will have broken the law if it turns out that
the employee also suffers from a disorder listed in the statute,
such as a thyroid problem, even though the employer was unaware of that condition. However, if it turns out that the employee does not have one of the listed disorders, the employer
may legally discriminate against the employee on that same basis: obesity. Such a holding, which distinguishes between actual
and perceived disabilities, "makes no sense. . . since that interpretation would only protect against discrimination in cases
where the wrongdoer accurately perceived the discriminatee's
'classification'. "167

B.

FINAL COMMENTS

The court may well have been influenced by the same stereotypical views of overweight people as the personnel director at
Community Foods,168 citing as "particularly noteworthy" cases
which view excess weight as a self-imposed or voluntary condition. 169 This view is shortsighted; a number of factors, including
heredity, socioeconomic status, gender, and race, influence an
162. Klarfeld, 633 P.2d at 208.
163. CAL. GOV'T CODE §. 12,993(a).
164. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,920.
165. 556 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1976).
166. Fields, 556 P.2d at 733.
167. Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., 594 A.2d 264 (citing Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d
900 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987)); see supra note 91.
168. See Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1145-46.
169. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1152.
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individual's body weight. I70 Obesity researchers consistently find
that obese people cannot control their weight. l7l
Obese people pay a serious price for their conditions. The
stigma of obesity results in social and economic hardship: overweight people complete fewer years of school, have lower household incomes, and have higher rates of household poverty.172 Economic and social disability are listed among the seven major
medical and social risks of obesity in a 1982 study.173 Race and
gender are implicated in obesity discrimination as well: a disproportionate number of obese people are African-American
women. 174
Many courts, including the California Supreme Court, either explicitly or implicitly reject obesity as a protected category
because they view it as a voluntary state.17II One argument
against including obesity as a protected category is the concern
that such a holding would open the floodgates to all manner of
"voluntary" condition discrimination claims, such as alcoholism
and drug addiction.
170. Steven L. Gortmaker, Aviva Must, James M. Perrin, Arthur M. Sobol, & William H. Dietz, Social and Economic Consequences of Overweight In Adolescence and
Young Adulthood, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1008-12 (1993); see also Jane Osborne Baker,
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protection For Victims of Weight Discrimination?, 29
UCLA L. REV. 947 (1982) (discussing the stigma and discrimination suffered by obese
people).
171. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Old Beliefs About Obesity Wear Thin, DET. FREE PRESS,
Nov. 30, 1992, at.1E; Michael S. Wilkes, M.D. & Miriam Shuchman, M.D., The Tyranny
of Size: Weight, Like Height, Is Inherited, but No One Expects a Tall Person to Cut Off
His Legs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, at 26; Albert J. Stunkard & Thorkild Sorensen, LA.,
Obesity and Socioeconomic Status - A Complex Relation, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1036,
(1993) (finding in part that adopted children's weight mirrors that of their birth parents,
not their adopted parents).
172. Stunkard & Thorkild, supra note 171, at 1036. The doctors who conducted this
study concluded that discrimination may be responsible for the economic detriment suffered by overweight people, and suggested that "overweight" be included as a protected
category in antidiscrimination laws. Id. at 1037. See also Karol V. Mason, Employment
Discrimination Against the Overweight, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 337 (1982) (discussing in
depth the employment discrimination often encountered by the overweight and examining medical efforts to find the causes of obesity).
173. Baker, supra note 170, at 951 n.39 (1992) (citing Obesity in America, INT'L. J.
OBESITY 363, 368 (1979) (G. Brayed.)).
174. Mason, Employment Discrimination Against the Overweight, supra note 83, at
344-45 (presenting in detail statistical analyses of race, gender, and socioeconomic status
in relation to obesity).
175. See, e.g., Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1152 (discussing with approval Tudyman and
Cook, both of which stress that the plaintiffs' weight was voluntarily self-imposed).
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This concern is unwarranted. The Americans with Disabilities Act includes under its shield such conditions as alcoholism
and drug addiction,I76 and excludes other "voluntary" conditions
such as compulsive gambling, pedophilia, and transvestitism. I77
The limits are already substantially delineated. To protect alcoholism and drug addiction while excluding obesity "raises significant questions of fairness. To exclude obese persons implies a
judgment that they are less seriously impaired or stigmatized, or
less deserving of legal protection for some other reason."I7S
VII.

CONCLUSION

Private employers may now, with impunity, freely discriminate against overweight but otherwise healthy people. This unreasonable result follows from a narrow and incomplete analysis
of the FEHA, and implicitly rejects the Legislature's express
mandate that the statute be liberally construed. The court's
analysis also violates its own rules of statutory construction.
The holding of Cassista directly contravenes the purpose of
the FEHA to "protect and safeguard the right and opportunity
of all persons to seek and hold employment free from
discrimination. "171'
Kimberly B. Dunworth *

176. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. Both drug addiction and alcoholism are also protected
disorders in the Rehabilitation Act. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, 11 4 (1981).
177. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1992); see also Brent E. Kidwell, The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990: Overview and Analysis, 26 IND. L. REV. 707 (1993).
178. Baker, Protection for Victims of Weight Discrimination? supra note 170, at
967 (arguing that obesity, like alcoholism and drug addiction, is popularly viewed as a
voluntary condition while medically classified as a disease, and should be accorded the
same legal protections).
179. Brown v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 272, 277 (Cal. 1984) (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12,920).
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